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1. Introduction
At ﬁrst glance, the battle lines over the European Union (EU) seem to be clear-
ly drawn. Some groups believe too much authority has already been transferred 
to the European level, while others would welcome even greater integration and 
centralisation in all areas. Some favour rapid expansion and new members, while 
others oppose expansion on principle. These arguments are oversimpliﬁcations that 
do not do justice to the questions about the future of Europe.
It is much more critical to identify not only the causes of the EU‘s tremendous 
success, but also the negative developments that pose a long-term threat to the 
freedom and prosperity of its citizens. Today, the EU can look back on a level of 
success unparalleled in the history of the continent. In the latter half of the 20th 
century, the EU has not only helped maintain peace in Europe, but has also fos-
tered dynamic economic growth in the member states, which in turn has boosted 
standards of living. Furthermore, the people enjoy considerable freedom of move-
ment and wide-ranging individual and democratic rights. Not even in their wildest 
dreams could most Europeans have imagined this, living as they were on a con-
tinent ravaged by the second world war. Ever since the Treaties of Rome in 1957, 
cooperation across member states has been growing and European integration has 
been extended to include a growing number of sectors. Step by step, a common 
economic area has developed into a political community.
The EU continues to attract many other countries and regions, as manifested 
in the desire for membership expressed by many European countries. The accession 
of 10 countries on 1 May 2004 does not, however, mark the end of the accession 
process; Bulgaria and Romania will join in the near future and other countries have 
also expressed interest. Furthermore, the EU serves as a role model for diverse re-
gional cooperation projects across the world.
However, the Union is not without its ﬂaws. In the eyes of many - and they are 
not wrong - it does not only stand for freedom and prosperity but also for centrali-
sation, regulation and bureaucratisation. Former Czech president Vaclav Havel was 
referring to the burgeoning complexity of European institutions and their aliena-
tion from the citizens when he demanded that Europe should no longer be divided 
into „a small group of EU specialists and a large mass of EU-Europe illiterates“.1 
1  See: Václav Havel und Jaques Delors im Gespräch: Gebt Europa eine Verfassung, DIE ZEIT June 
2001.
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In liberal terms, this demand can only be partly met through attempts to enhance 
awareness about existing institutions and mechanisms. Priority should instead be 
given to rendering European institutions more transparent and less complex. This is 
not easy, as the ‚EU specialists‘ mentioned above are naturally reluctant to forfeit 
their knowledge advantage. Simple, transparent institutions can go a long way in 
rectifying the ﬂaws of democracy which, needless to say, still exist at the European 
level. Moreover, subsidy systems-the cause of uneconomic and unjust redistribution 
and stunted competition-are a threat to our common future in Europe.
Many proponents of European integration and many diehard Europeans do Eu-
rope a disservice by repeatedly underplaying these problems and keeping them out 
of the public domain. Their arguments are based on unfounded fears that critical 
discussions would toughen the stance of a fundamentally ‚anti-Europe‘ population. 
The concept of Europe is now an integral part of the lives of most of its people and 
few would want to go back to a system of tightly sealed borders, or to surrender 
the enormous economic advantages offered by the open European markets. 
However, many citizens are justiﬁably sceptical when they discover that seve-
ral problems are simply swept under the carpet or at least not openly discussed. If 
Europe is to be viable in the future, we must not ﬁght shy of tackling these pro-
blems. It is a mistake to strive towards increased centralisation in decision-making 
processes because this achieves exactly the opposite of what its proponents want 
or claim they want. Centralisation and greater integration do not foster stability 
and growth, but indeed suppress the creativity inherent in individuals, regions and 
countries. Decisions should be taken at the centre if-and only if-centralisation is 
indispensable for the functioning of the common market and for the rights of free-
dom and security of EU citizens. In all other political ﬁelds, we must remember that 
the best solutions are arrived at through competition, not by central authorities.
Several liberal principles have been incorporated into the EU Constitutional 
Treaty signed by heads of member states on 29 October 2004, but subsequently 
rejected in public referendums held in France and the Netherlands. While liberals 
agree that the document marks considerable progress, they also believe it is ﬂa-
wed. Nevertheless, its shortcomings should give us a good insight into the current 
problems hampering the development of Europe, among them the monetary policy 
and the weakness of the subsidiarity principle. We could sum up by saying that it is 
still far too easy for central institutions to exert inﬂuence and assume responsibility. 
Even though the sections on social justice and the ban on discrimination strike the 
right notes, they open the door to greater centralisation and could jeopardise some 
of the principles of the rule of law, particularly the vital freedom of contract.
Finally, the EU has a special responsibility towards the countries striving for 
membership, who are also expected to meet the rigid Copenhagen criteria and 
are entitled to the same assistance offered to all new members who have had to 
fulﬁl the criteria to date. It is also important that the EU lends a helping hand in 
resolving existing conﬂicts across Europe besides opening up prospects of fruitful 
cooperation in countries currently not candidates for EU accession.
2.  Unity in diversity: competition, the secret of success
For centuries, Europe‘s uniqueness has lain in its tremendous diversity. During the 
Industrial Revolution, precisely this aspect was the secret of the continent‘s success 
and subsequent economic development that overshadowed the rest of the world. 
British economic historian Eric Lionel Jones2 also recognised the importance of this 
factor, which may come as a surprise to many who have always considered larger, 
centralised units to be a worthy goal. The reason is clear: decentralisation fosters 
competition. Locational competition, the subject of much discussion today, is not 
new to Europe where it has been practised for hundreds of years.
Many European regions have always competed with each other to attract trade 
and investment to raise their standards of living. Similarly, institutions and political 
systems must also compete with each other because testing alternative concepts 
provides the knowledge required for long-term decisions. Socialism and planned 
economies failed primarily because those in power assumed such knowledge about 
the future that they could not possibly have possessed. It is therefore vital that all 
ﬁelds of politics, if possible, are subject to competition. Tax systems must compe-
te with each other as must institutions of social policy; it does not follow that a 
‚downward spiral‘ is the inevitable consequence. When tracing the development 
of taxation over the twentieth century, we realise how completely absurd it is to 
speak of downward competition. In those days, even dyed-in-the-wool socialists 
would have considered today‘s tax rates shameless. More than anything else, a 
competitive system makes it easier for individuals and companies to see what they 
get in return for their taxes, thus compelling countries, local governments and mu-
nicipalities to optimise efﬁciency without wasting their ﬁnancial resources.
In the course of history, the division of Europe into many different countries 
with frequently shifting borders has of course not been only beneﬁcial. The conti-
nent was ravaged by war for centuries and its fragmentation resulted in customs 
2  See: Eric Lionel Jones: The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the 
History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge 1981.
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duties and other barriers that hampered trade and held back prosperity. The EU 
and its precursor organisations are therefore a tremendous step forward for the 
people of Europe. In a historical comparison, the second half of the 20th century 
heralded an extended period of peace where individual rights and the rule of law 
assumed precedence. Similarly, the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece is barely conceivable without the examples and inﬂu-
ences of European democracies. European structures that guarantee freedom of 
the individual, democracy, rule of law and free trade must therefore be ﬁne-tuned 
and must themselves fulﬁl the criteria laid down for a functioning democracy in an 
individual country. One must clearly distinguish between ﬁelds that require stan-
dardised political structures and those where decision-making powers lie with the 
member countries or with legislative bodies in the countries themselves.
In this context, the principle of subsidiarity is a good guide for liberal policy. 
It can also be applied when deciding whether a problem should be handled at the 
political level at all or is better left to the individual. Currently, some areas tend to 
look to the EU to regulate matters which, at least from the liberal point of view, 
do not (or hardly) warrant state regulation. The planned EU advertising directives 
may serve as an example.
In many cases ‚Brussels‘ does not, however, simply assume authority by practi-
cally wresting it away from individual countries. National governments also tend to 
delegate several tasks to Brussels and absolve themselves of their responsibilities 
by passing the buck to the EU. They would much rather act as distributors of ‚allo-
wances‘ from the countless and increasingly obscure subsidy pots in Brussels.
3.  Clearly-deﬁned competencies versus centralisation
The principle of subsidiarity is the liberal guideline underpinning the distribution of 
competencies among individual political levels, but is not conﬁned to this sphere 
alone. Building on the basic premise of individual responsibility and accountability, 
we can conclude that subsidiarity begins with the individual. Before asking whether 
the community, the country or the EU is responsible, one must ask whether the ci-
tizens themselves can shoulder the responsibility by taking matters into their own 
hands. Many difﬁcult questions about the allocation of responsibility to individual 
political levels sort themselves out when priority is accorded to the private sphe-
re, without ifs or buts. With regard to social or labour market policy, for example, 
where there is always a strong tendency to let Europe decide, the liberal position 
is clear: people must ﬁrst be in a position to take care of themselves. Only then is 
targeted and efﬁcient state intervention permissible in some cases. 
Competition is especially important in areas with excessive redistribution, as 
it is the only incentive for politicians to be frugal with funds and turn a deaf ear 
to the demands of stakeholders. „In these ﬁelds, harmonisation from above must 
be replaced by a pro-competition policy, which, inter alia, advocates the ‚country 
of origin‘ principle instead of central standardisation.“3
Decisions must be taken at the European level in areas like the common market 
and freedom of movement for EU citizens where the secrets of the EU‘s success 
(discussed above) must be guaranteed. To these core competencies that must un-
equivocally be assigned to the EU, we can add the following competencies formu-
lated by the federalism commission of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation under 
the chairmanship of Otto Count Lambsdorff:
-  Guarantee of freedoms agreed in the Treaties of Rome (1957) (free movement 
of persons, goods, services and capital), which should indeed form the essence 
of all European orders 
-  Financial and monetary policy
-  The Community‘s foreign trade policy
-  European competition policy to secure basic freedoms in the domestic market 
and free competition with regard to trade between countries.4
Of course, mixed competencies and parallel legislations cannot be completely 
avoided in the future; they are, in fact, essential in respect of asylum and immig-
ration and environmental policies. In the case of environmental policy, it is vital to 
ensure that the EU regulates only those areas that could have cross-border, even 
global, implications. The asylum and immigration policy must be better coordina-
ted because pertinent political decisions taken by one country could automatically 
affect others, given the freedom of movement within the EU. In the ﬁght against 
crime and terrorism, there must be greater cooperation between the authorities 
in different countries and the collaborative structures must work more efﬁciently, 
not only because they must overcome emergent threats but mainly because this 
is the only way to guarantee the rule of law for all EU citizens. At the same time, 
liberals should be vigilant and ensure that, in the name of security, we do not over-
react to a terrorist attack, for example, and thus violate fundamental civil rights. 
3  Für ein Europa der Freiheit und der Bürger. Vorschläge einer Expertenkommission unter Vorsitz 
von Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, in: Hubertus Müller-Groeling (ed.), Reform des Föderalismus. 
Kleine Festgabe für Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Berlin 2002, pp. 112-113. http://admin.fnst.org/up-
loads/487/foed-m5.pdf, p. 5.
4  Ibid, p. 111, internet: p. 4.
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The standards set forth in the German constitution to safeguard the private sphere 
and freedom of the citizen must be applied at the European level too. For example, 
the European warrant for arrest must be reworked to bring the guarantees of the 
rule of law in line with German regulations.
Whether the EU requires a common foreign and security policy is a subject for 
constant discussion. Negotiations were in fact under way a while ago in Germany 
to propose a candidate for the post of ‚European Foreign Minister‘. As the interests 
of member states differ widely in this regard, the principal goal should be to achie-
ve greater coordination and accord. A few thoughts on the EU‘s foreign relations 
are discussed later in this paper.
4.  Unjust and growth-reducing subsidies – 
 not only in Europe
A substantial portion of the EU budget goes in subsidies earmarked for certain eco-
nomic sectors and regions, the most well-known example being the EU agricultural 
policy, which consumes about half the budget. It is often argued that these ﬁgures 
distort the true picture, as the agricultural policy is one of the few political ﬁelds 
conﬁned almost completely to the European level and therefore incurs relatively 
high costs. While this is true, it really implies that agricultural policy would be 
better off at the level of individual countries. The high subsidies would still be un-
acceptable, but at least national governments would have to assume responsibili-
ty vis-à-vis their tax payers and consumers and would also make more concerted 
efforts to dismantle the subsidies.
According to ﬁgures released by the OECD (the ﬁgures refer to the expanded 
EU with 25 members), agriculture in the EU was subsidised to the tune of over 
121 billion euros in 2004. This is 1.2 % of the EU‘s GDP. It includes direct ﬁnancial 
transfers to producers as well as higher market prices that can be traced back to 
various forms of regulation and protectionism and are ultimately born by consu-
mers and tax payers.  
A much debated step away from the current subsidy system is the decoupling 
of production and beneﬁts, which, it is argued, would somewhat soften the crus-
hing blow for several developing countries. However, we must heed the fact that 
an income subsidy is always an incentive for the manufacture of products which 
can then be offered at especially low prices; in other words, the impact would be 
similar to, if somewhat milder than, the current case. Since most enterprises should 
continue to exist, which means that market forces cannot take effect, production 
will continue as earlier, i.e. not be demand-oriented. From the liberal perspective, 
the long-term goal can be nothing short of a complete abolition of agricultural 
subsidies.
EU subsidies are not limited to agriculture. This paper mentions only the Cohe-
sion Fund. Regardless of how well-meaning these redistributions may be and how 
sound arguments in their favour may appear, they always conceal the very potent 
danger of transforming people, regions and economic sectors into permanent sub-
sidy beneﬁciaries and destroying any incentive they may have had for self-initiative 
and enterprise. Instead, because of the incentives offered, all political efforts are 
focused on trying to obtain the largest possible slice of the subsidy cake.
If subsidies are unavoidable in a particular sector, they should at least be degres-
sive and come with an expiry date. Last, but not least, subsidies like trade barriers 
set up to protect certain economic sectors from competition, can have disastrous 
repercussions for many countries that are yet to attain the levels of economic de-
velopment enjoyed by the EU. They are unable to exploit the advantages they en-
joy in some economic sectors, to improve their standards of living. A particularly 
drastic example of the perverse consequences of this European policy (of course 
there are similar policies in the USA and Japan) is the sugar industry. Production 
costs for sugar within the EU today are about three times as high as in various 
African countries, for example, Malawi and Zambia. Not only do sugar producers 
receive massive subsidies from the EU, but the sugar market is also protected from 
imports. There are strong incentives to produce far more sugar than required in 
Europe, which is now the world‘s largest sugar exporter. It is estimated that the-
se subsidies keep the world market price about one-ﬁfth lower than it would be 
without market distortions. Consequently, a country such as Mozambique suffers 
an annual loss of around 100 million euros, which is about as much as it receives 
from Europe in the form of development aid. This policy also impacts adversely on 
agricultural producers in the EU‘s neighbours.
One could list many more examples, but the fundamental argument remains 
the same: subsidies create incentives for over-production and distort world mar-
ket price. European producers, given the opportunity to ﬂood world markets with 
cheap products, negate the competitive advantages other countries may have had. 
Often the extensive damage to domestic markets paralyses entire branches in the 
agricultural sector.
Besides direct subsidies, the barriers set up by the EU on its external borders to 
protect some product groups have negative consequences for consumers in Europe 
and for suppliers, often from less developed countries. It is striking that customs 
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duties and other trade barriers are particularly high in branches of industry that 
could help several countries advance their economies, the textile industry being 
a case in point.
5.  A constitution for Europe   
The ‚no‘ vote cast by the citizens of France and the Netherlands has pushed away 
the possibility of the European Constitutional Treaty coming into force. While this 
does not spell disaster, it should make us think long and hard about the values and 
principles that characterise Europe. The constitution guarantees the fundamental 
individual rights that underlie the rule of law and democracy. It creates a basis for 
the order of European institutions and deﬁnes the distribution of competencies 
between European and national levels. In liberal eyes, although parts of the con-
stitution do make a signiﬁcant contribution to the future of Europe, there is still 
reason for criticism.
First, the style of the constitutional debate. The attempts to rush through such 
an important document were and are shocking. Even after the draft has been re-
jected in two public referendums, most politicians cannot think beyond shelving 
the constitutional issue or warning against amendments.
It would certainly be presumptuous to call for a debate of the quality and depth 
that marked the debate on the American constitution 200 years ago. However, the 
cause deserved more discussion and debate about fundamental issues, which would 
also have aroused greater citizen interest and acceptance. A public referendum 
should have been planned in all the countries at the very outset, but this is where 
the initial ﬂaws in the document become apparent: its sheer volume and diversity 
of technical rules and regulations make it ill-suited for a referendum. As sections 
II, III and IV are often nothing more than summaries and speciﬁcations of existing 
treaties, the ﬁrst section should be clearly set out, and when supplemented with 
key statements from other sections, it would become something like a formal con-
stitution. In this way, the document would be easier to understand, could be widely 
debated and would lend itself well to a public referendum.
As early as in 1993, the European Constitutional Group comprising distingu-
ished academics had presented a radically liberal and radically simple draft; the 
Group followed this up with an improved version in 2003.5 This text of just eight 
pages outlines an enduring framework oriented on classic liberal constitutional 
principles for the co-existence of people in Europe. Of course, it is illusory to believe 
that it can be implemented in the current political scenario, but it is a yardstick to 
measure the degree of freedom in constitutions that have many more regulations 
and constraints on personal freedom. The Group has now submitted yet another 
draft oriented more towards the structure of the Constitutional Treaty and unde-
niably based on liberal principles.6
Some shortcomings of the European Constitutional Treaty will be discussed from 
the liberal perspective, as they provide excellent examples of the lines of conﬂict 
in European politics between political direction and the need for reform. Liberals 
believe that freedom must be given primacy over equality even in the preamble, 
as is the case in other sections of the constitutional draft. Overall, far too much 
is made of the positive rights to beneﬁts and consequently even social justice and 
full employment are deﬁned as goals. While the concepts may be abstract, they 
do invite interventions at the European level that question the commitment of the 
individual state to exercise its authority particularly with regard to social policy 
and subsidiarity. 
Equality before the law is an extremely valuable commodity for liberals and 
nobody has the right of disposition. However, the paragraphs dealing with equality 
(Art. II-20 - II-26) and non-discrimination (Art. III-7 - III-8) in the draft constitution 
could clash with the freedom of contract, another valuable commodity. The ﬁrst 
signs of this are already surfacing in the policies implemented by the EU.
However, in several other sections too, the devil lurks in the details. For examp-
le, while the endeavour to enshrine the principle of subsidiarity in the constitution 
is to be welcomed, it must be explicitly enshrined in the preamble and in the EU‘s 
values and goals. ‚Article 9: Fundamental Principles‘ must be formulated more pre-
cisely. The article stipulates that competencies can be transferred to the European 
level if this makes it ‚easier‘ to attain the pertinent objectives. This opens the door 
to a range of widely differing interpretations and experience has shown that such 
wishy-washy formulations almost always culminate in increased centralisation. 
Therefore, competencies should only be transferred to the European level if there 
is no other way of achieving the targeted goals. The principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality should not be limited to Article 9, but must also be enshrined in 
other pertinent articles in the constitution.7 
5  Internet: http://www.european-constitutional-group.org/pdf/Newdraft2003.pdf
6  Internet: http://admin.fnst.org/uploads/1207/A_Proposal_for_a_Revised_Constitutional_Trea-
ty_10.04.06.pdf
7  For more information see: Forderungen der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung zum Entwurf der Verfas-
sung der Europäischen Union, Potsdam 2004. http://admin.fnst.org/uploads/487/EUVerfassung.
pdf, pp. 6-8.
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In areas of shared responsibility (and they must also exist in the future), Eu-
ropean law should not, in principle, have primacy over the constitution of the 
individual country. In individual cases, the law of the member states must have 
primacy over EU law, marking a signiﬁcant departure from countries with federal 
constitutions.
A crucial prerequisite for the ongoing dynamic economic development is a stable 
currency. In recent decades, the methods used to ensure stability have proved their 
efﬁcacy beyond doubt. It is essential to have an independent central bank that is 
not under any political inﬂuence and works solely towards the goal of achieving 
monetary stability. EU politicians have yet to fully realise this. They make repeated 
attempts to intervene, sometimes through ‚suggestions‘ or even blatant demands 
such as the call for reduced interest rates. While the European Central Bank has 
always successfully resisted such attempts, its constitutional position must be 
signiﬁcantly reinforced. To this end, monetary stability should be adopted as an 
objective in the EU constitution. On the other hand, there is the danger that the 
‚full mutual cooperation‘ to be practised by the institutions of the Union as set 
forth in Article 18, can be misused if interpreted as a reason for exerting inﬂuence 
through other organs.
6.  Expansion as an opportunity
In 2004, 10 new member states-Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus joined the EU. The accession 
presented not only a historical opportunity but also a great challenge. The pros-
pect of EU accession has fostered and accelerated the transformation process in 
the eight erstwhile socialist countries. With this goal in mind, the reform-oriented, 
pro-market and democratic forces were able to proffer many convincing arguments 
in favour of reconstructing their countries and societies. A little over a decade ago, 
it would have been inconceivable that these countries would join the EU in such a 
short time-at least in historical terms. But the reforms were more successful and 
pushed through more quickly than many had believed possible given the upheaval 
in central, east and south-east Europe. It should not be forgotten that the prospect 
of accession was a signiﬁcant factor in breaking the stalemate in Cyprus even if a 
ﬁnal solution to the conﬂict has yet to be found.
The accession countries are still undergoing reform and there is a huge back-
log to tackle, particularly in the economic sector. An above-average growth rate 
is crucial if the standard of living in these countries is to be on a par with that in 
other EU countries. This is only possible if the framework conditions for investments 
and business continue to improve and if consistent efforts are made to guide these 
countries towards becoming functioning states based on the rule of law. 
The accession process has yet again highlighted the EU‘s internal problems. 
Political debates in the run-up to membership have often focused far too much on 
the distribution of parliamentary seats in Brussels, agricultural subsidies and regi-
onal assistance. This means, among other things, that the new members are often 
perceived primarily as threats and as rival contenders for ﬁnancial beneﬁts. Even 
among the new member states one can already see the ﬁrst signs of the ﬁght for 
beneﬁts from Brussels. On the other hand, societies of member states that were 
earlier part of the socialist camp, can now serve as examples of a dynamic and 
optimistic approach to reform. Besides the new markets (also vital for the German 
economy) and greater cultural diversity, it is precisely this ability and willingness 
to change that could lead Europe out of its fossilisation in some sectors. While 
large countries like France or Germany may often ﬁnd the self-conﬁdence of new 
member states annoying, it is nevertheless an important and invigorating moment 
in the political debate in Europe.
7.  New neighbours: opportunities 
for the entire continent
The EU‘s expansion has brought about many changes for the countries of Euro-
pe. Some countries will now become immediate neighbours of the EU while many 
others are either working towards EU accession or at least see it as a long-term 
prospect. For the expansion process, much will depend on the successful integra-
tion of the new members admitted in 2004. It is, however, more important that 
the EU sorts out its structural problems. Only then can it continue to set an en-
couraging example to other countries and provide them with incentives to work 
towards freedom, the free market and democracy.
The EU‘s neighbours include the Balkan countries of which Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are closest to accession. In recent years, signiﬁcant progress has been made in 
these two countries, accession negotiations have been completed and membership 
in 2007 is a very realistic aim. Subsequent negotiations for membership will fol-
low the pattern of negotiations conducted with the current new members: conc-
rete, transparent criteria will be applied and assistance offered to resolve complex 
outstanding problems. The Copenhagen Criteria are good guidelines. They include 
the following. 
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-  Political criterion: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities
-  Economic criterion: the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union
-  Acquis criterion: the ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union.8 
The criteria apply equally to all countries and Turkey is no exception. Should it 
succeed in establishing an order based on the rule of law and set up free market 
institutions, it cannot be excluded on grounds of culture or religion. Europe does 
not rest exclusively on Christian values that are apparently inaccessible to Muslim 
majority states, but is built on a liberal order that underpins the co-existence of 
people from vastly different cultural and religious backgrounds. Turkey has recently 
undertaken many important steps in the right direction, raising hope but is still a 
long way from fulﬁlling all the accession criteria.
Divergent points of departure and outcomes are evident in the reform processes 
in Albania and the countries of the erstwhile Yugoslavia. While Slovenia is already 
an EU member and Croatia obtained candidate status in 2004, many other coun-
tries are facing a range of difﬁcult problems often related to the violent conﬂicts 
that have rocked the Balkans in the last 150 years. The ‚critical‘ phase may be over, 
but we still have a long way to go before the conﬂicts are permanently resolved. 
Kosovo‘s unsettled status conceals many dangers. The independence of a country 
is not a panacea for all problems but could be a ﬁrst step towards stability.
Even those European countries that were once part of the erstwhile Soviet Union 
are now moving closer to the EU. However, as these countries are in far greater need 
of reform than those already discussed, it is important to consolidate cooperation 
with the EU. The EU‘s new external boundary should not be allowed to become an 
impenetrable wall keeping out Ukrainians and Belarussians. The same is true of the 
Republic of Moldova and the Southern Caucasian countries. These countries should 
see in the EU not only an attractive market but also a partner who will help them 
resolve existing conﬂicts and support them in setting up structures based on the 
rule of law. Following the political upheavals in recent years, the people in Geor-
gia, Ukraine and other countries are pinning their hopes on the prospect of joining 
Europe and should not be disappointed by the EU. The European policy with regard 
to neighbouring states is a ﬁrst step in the right direction but, in the long term, 
Europe will also have to face the question of admitting new members. It would be 
a disastrous message to the people in the countries concerned, if the EU were to 
exhaust its capacity for new members because of internal disagreements about 
ﬁnancing the gigantic redistribution systems.
A constructive and critical partnership must also be the guiding motive for 
Russia. Short-term interests in raw materials should not be allowed to dilute the 
standards. Peaceful co-existence and the economic advantages of trade and co-
operation go hand in hand. A stable and peaceful order is inconceivable without 
economic growth that leads to prosperity in individual countries.
8. Europe‘s worldwide responsibility
The EU is one of the world‘s most afﬂuent regions. As it can also be upheld as an 
example of individual freedom and respect for human rights, it acquires a special 
responsibility. There is still armed conﬂict in many parts of the world and the in-
ternational community must help ﬁnd a solution. The EU can and must play a vital 
and constructive role, working towards a coordinated and harmonised foreign and 
security policy. This is not easy to achieve. Discussions about a future European 
foreign minister and who will occupy this post are not helpful and divert focus 
from the real problems.
Within the EU today, there are widely divergent and to some extent conﬂicting 
interests and opinions with regard to foreign policy. Arrogance towards new EU 
members, recently observed, is a very poor adviser. If a stand is taken by leading 
German or French politicians, it does not necessarily follow that it is correct. This 
attitude makes an open discussion about different standpoints virtually impossible 
and is a serious impediment to a joint foreign policy because no country will be 
willing to constantly abide by the interests of the ‚large‘ member countries.
A dangerous trend has recently been observed in some European countries: 
Europe is expected to rival the USA, particularly with regard to foreign and security 
policy. There is talk of a ‚counter weight‘ to the power of the US but it is treache-
rous to try and drive a wedge between the EU and its strongest partner. Although 
the historical reasons may be highly signiﬁcant, they are not the only ones. 
Without a close partner in the US, it would not have been possible to reconstruct 
Europe after the Second World War. Above all, EU countries and their transatlantic 
partner share common values. Their people enjoy individual freedoms and demo-
8  See: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/in-
dex_en.htm
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cratic rights; private property is protected. The binding values must also form the 
basis of the foreign policy and, as good partners, the problems should be freely 
and openly discussed. Only through constructive cooperation can institutions be 
designed to meet the ever-growing challenges.
Most important, the EU‘s global responsibility also encompasses the commit-
ment to guarantee unrestricted access to European markets for developing coun-
tries. This is at least as important as the development cooperation that should 
always be based on the principles of the free market and human rights. In this 
context, negotiations within the WTO framework merit special attention. At WTO 
meetings, Europe continues to defend protectionist interests. In the long term, 
the global economy, from which Europe still beneﬁts, can only continue to grow if 
there is a system of free trade where all countries participate. Thanks to its politi-
cal institutions and economic strength, Europe can do much to enhance peaceful 
co-existence and raise standards of living in the world. It must make better use of 
the opportunities that come its way.
20 Freedom and Competition: The Future of Europe
